

ISS 2683: What is Statecraft?

Quest 2

I. General Information

Class Meetings

- Spring 2025
- 3 credits
- Attendance: 100% In-Person, No GTAs, 35 Residential
- Period TR Period 4 & 4-5 - T 10:40am-11:30am R 10:40am-12:35pm
- Location CSE 0453

Instructor

- Charlie Laderman
- Office CSE 0530
- Tel: TBD
- Office Hours - Wednesday 10:45am - 12:45 (or by appointment)
- claderman@ufl.edu

Course Description

How do governments manage their scarce resources while pursuing a broad array of ambitions? How can policymakers utilize different types of power (cultural, economic, military and the like) to achieve their goals both effectively and efficiently? In a rapidly evolving and intricate world, how can leaders discern short-term and long-term priorities, opportunities, and threats? The key to addressing these issues is the concept of strategy--which is about aligning objectives with the resources at hand--and statecraft, which is the art and practice of managing the nation's affairs.

Quest and General Education Credit

- Quest 2
- Social Sciences
- Writing Requirement (WR) 2000 words

This course accomplishes the [Quest](#) and [General Education](#) objectives of the subject areas listed above. A minimum grade of C is required for Quest and General Education credit. Courses intended to satisfy Quest and General Education requirements cannot be taken S-U.

The Writing Requirement (WR) ensures students both maintain their fluency in writing and use writing as a tool to facilitate learning.

Course grades have two components. To receive writing requirement credit, a student must receive a grade of C or higher and a satisfactory completion of the writing component of the course.

Required Readings and Works

1. Required readings for the course are available as PDFs on Canvas.
2. The writing manual for this course is: *The Economist Style Guide*, 11th edn. (2015). ISBN: 9781610395755. This is available as a PDF on Canvas.
3. Materials and Supplies Fees: n/a.

Course Objectives

1. Identify, describe, and explain the methodologies used across the social sciences to examine essential ideas about statecraft.
2. Identify, describe, and explain key ideas and questions about statecraft from renaissance to the present.
3. Analyse different approaches to statecraft from philosophical, political and historical works.
4. Evaluate competing accounts of human reaction to concepts that challenge our own notions of statecraft, using close reading, critical analysis, class discussion, and personal reflection.
5. Develop and present clear and effective written and oral work that demonstrates critical engagement with course texts, and experiential learning activities.
6. Communicate well-supported ideas and arguments effectively within class discussion and debates, with clear oral presentation and written work articulating students' personal experiences and reflections on statecraft.
7. Connect course content with students' intellectual, personal, and professional lives at UF and beyond.
8. Reflect on students' own and others' experience with statecraft, in class discussion and written work.

II. Graded Work

Description of Graded Work

1. Active Participation and Attendance: 20%

a. Participation: 10%

- i. An exemplar participant shows evidence of having done the assigned reading before each class, consistently offers thoughtful points and questions for discussion, and listens considerately to other discussants. See participation rubric below. (R) There might be spontaneous quizzes throughout the term or requests from the Professor for questions or responses to be submitted ahead of class in order to evaluate engagement with the readings.

b. Class Attendance: 10%

- i. On-time class attendance is required for this component of the course grade. You may have two unexcused absences without any penalty, but starting with the third class missed your grade will be affected. Starting with the third unexcused absence, each unexcused absence reduces your attendance grade by 2/3: an A- becomes a B, and so on.
- ii. Except for absence because of religious holiday observance, documentation is required for excused absences, per university policy. Excessive unexcused absences (10 or more) will result in failure of the course. If you miss 10 or more classes (excused or not), you will miss material essential for successful completion of the course.

2. Experiential Learning Component: 10%

- a. During this semester, the class will visit the Smathers Library to consult the library's collections on a major historical event. Students will be asked to identify a particular document in the collections and write a critical analytical response on why the document is significant and what it tells us about the topic. Students will submit a minimum 300-500 word analysis assignment.

3. In-class First-Person Presentations: 15%

- a. Each week, during class, students will make an oral presentation arguing either for or against the statecraft of one of the figures discussed during the semester. For example, they might argue make the case for why Woodrow Wilson was far-sighted thinker, why appeasement was a rational policy or why Henry Kissinger's statecraft was immoral. Or they might argue the complete opposite. Students will offer a 5-7 minute presentation, and then field questions from the instructor and their classmates. Marks will be awarded for subject knowledge, the fluency and engagingness of the presentation, and the confidence with which the student responds to questions about the topics. At the end of the first week of class, there will be a sign up for which week you would like to do your presentation in.

4. Midterm Examination: 25%

- a. In Week 8, a midterm examination will be administered in class. The examination will be an in-class, 50-minute exam including essay, short-answer, true-false, and/or multiple-choice questions.. Professor will provide written feedback on your essay and/or short-answer questions. See grading rubric below. (R).

5. Final Analytical Paper: 30%

- a. During Week 13, you will submit a 2,000-2,500 word analytical essay addressing a prompt provided to you by Week 5. You will develop an analytic argument based on your own thesis responding to the prompt, incorporating course material on the history and

philosophy of that relationship. Your paper must incorporate at least four course readings. See Canvas for more details. Professor will provide written feedback. See grading rubric below. (R). Part of the grade might involve an oral or written response to professor's feedback on your paper.

- b. Professor will evaluate and provide written feedback, on all the student's written assignments with respect to grammar, punctuation, clarity, coherence, and organization.
- c. You may want to access the university's [Writing Studio](#).
- d. An additional writing guide website can be found at [OWL](#).
- e. See Writing Assessment Rubric on syllabus.
- f. In the weeks leading up to submission, you will be invited to meet with the professor for ten minutes during office hours to discuss your essay and to receive feedback.
- g. A portion of the final mark will involve a written in-class assignment response paper based on your essay.

III. Annotated Weekly Schedule

WEEK 1: WHAT IS STATECRAFT? (JANUARY 12th and JANUARY 14th)

The question of what statecraft is can be tied to the study of grand strategy. Despite the ever-increasing popularity of the term "grand strategy," scholars can only agree that grand strategy refers to something that has the characteristics of being long-term in scope, related to the state's highest priorities, and concerned with all spheres of statecraft (military, diplomatic, and economic). Where or what is the precise entity or phenomenon that manifests these characteristics? Is there a single concept of grand strategy that guides statecraft?

Presentation: Is there currently a crisis of American statecraft?

Readings: 50 pages

1. *Hal Brands, 'Introduction: The Meaning and Challenge of Grand Strategy,' in *What Good is Grand Strategy? Power and Purpose in American Statecraft from Harry S. Truman to George W. Bush* (Cornell University Press, 2014) 16 pages.
2. Philip Zelikow, 'The Atrophy of American Statecraft,' *Foreign Affairs*, January/February 2024. 20 Pages.
3. Daniel Drezner, 'The Trajectory of American Statecraft and Kids These Days,' Tufts Fletcher Russia and Eurasia Program, January 15 2024 - <https://sites.tufts.edu/flecherrussia/the-trajectory-of-american-statecraft-and-kids-these-days/> 3 Pages.
4. Andrew Roberts' Secrets of Statecraft, "A Masterclass in History from Dr. Henry Kissinger," 31 March 2022, Hoover Institution, 5 pages.
5. "Why Writing by Hand Is Better for Memory and Learning," *Scientific American*, <https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/why-writing-by-hand-is-better-for-memory-and-learning/> (6 pages).

WEEK 2: MACHIAVELLI: THE FUNDAMENTALS OF STATECRAFT (JANUARY 19th AND 21st)

Niccolò Machiavelli (1469-1527) has been called the father of modern political philosophy. If Americans remember him at all, though, it is more likely as the Father of Lies: the political schemer with an eponymous adjective thanks to *The Prince*, his manual of amoral advice to rulers. Machiavelli's experiences taught him that war, and military matters in general, had always been used politically. This week, we will analyze how his statecraft viewed war as an extension of political values and goals.

Presentation: Can Machiavelli still teach us how to wield power in the modern world? OR What insights does

Machiavelli offer for American statecraft?

Readings: 77 pages

1. *Matthew Kroenig, "Machiavelli and the Naissance of Modern Strategy," in *The New Makers of Modern Strategy*, ed. Hal Brands (Princeton: Princeton University Press), pp. 91-115. (25 pages).
2. *Niccolo Machiavelli, *The Prince* (Translated by W.K. Marriott), (New York, 1908) Chapters 13-36. (24 pages)
3. Carrese, Paul, Coletta, Damon (2015), *America's Machiavelli Problem Restoring Prudent Leadership in US Strategy*, Strategic Studies Quarterly, pp.18-43 (25 pages) - https://www.airuniversity.af.edu/Portals/10/SSQ/documents/Volume-09_Issue-4/Coletta.pdf
4. Michael Ignatieff, 'Machiavelli Was Right,' *The Atlantic*, December 15 2013, 3 pages.
5. (Bonus) Sean Illing with Erica Benner, 'You're Using "Machiavellian" Wrong,' *The Gray Area*, Vox, <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=zL9eJN6Yo6c>

WEEK 4: NAPOLEON BONAPARTE (JANUARY 28th and 30th)

The French Revolution is often depicted as the process that heralded the start of the modern era. The wars that it produced are regarded as the first total wars, transforming Europe in almost every sense. The figure that looms largest over the period is Napoleon Bonaparte, who came to dominate France and much of Europe. This week we will explore Napoleon's impact on war, strategy and statecraft. Only Jesus Christ has had more books written about him than Napoleon, and his historical reputation remains as bitterly contested as ever.

Presentation: Make the case either for or against Napoleon's statecraft.

Required Readings: 61 pages

1. *Henry Kissinger, 'The French Revolution and its Aftermath,' in Henry Kissinger, *World Order* (Penguin, 2014), pp. 41-49
2. *Jordan Michael Smith, 'Napoleon: The First Modern Politician,' *National Interest*, December 20 2015 - <https://nationalinterest.org/feature/napoleon-the-first-modern-politician-14690> 2 pages.
3. Peter Paret, 'Napoleon and the Revolution in War,' in Gordon Craig and Peter Paret (eds.) *Makers of Modern Strategy from Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age* (Princeton University Press, 1986) 20 pages.
4. Paul Schroder, 'Napoleon's Foreign Policy: A Criminal Enterprise,' in *The Journal of Military History*, Vol. 54, No. 2 (Apr. 1990), 16 pages.
5. Walter Russell Mead, 'Napoleon's Lesson for Trump,' *Wall Street Journal*, August 11 2025 - https://www.wsj.com/opinion/napoleons-lessons-for-trump-president-power-france-emperor-bf60820b?mod=Searchresults_pos2&page=1 2 pages.
6. William Doyle, 'Revolutionary Napoleon,' in Doyle, *France and the Age of Revolution: Regimes Old and New from Louis XIV to Napoleon Bonaparte* (I.B. Tauris, 2013) 13 pages.

WEEK 5: KLEMENS VON METTERNICH AND THE CONCERT OF EUROPE (FEBRUARY 3rd and 5th)

This week we will analyze the statecraft of Klemens von Metternich (1773-1859) of Austria, the chief architect of the alliance that brought down Napoleon and of the Vienna Treaty of 1815. In the aftermath of the Napoleonic Wars, he designed a collective security system designed to regulate European politics. This represented a novel experiment in European union which remains a pressing concern in the contemporary international system.

Presentation: Is the Concert of Europe still relevant to policymakers today? OR How effective was Metternich's statecraft in shaping a durable European order?

Readings: 68 pages

1. *Henry Kissinger, *World Order*, pp. 49-76.
2. Kyle Lascurettes, "The Concert of Europe and Great-Power Governance Today: What Can the Order of 19th-Century Europe Teach Policymakers About International Order in the 21st Century?" (RAND Corporation, 2017), 24 pages.
3. Christopher Clark, 'A Rock of Order: Review of Metternich: Strategist and Visionary,' *London Review of Books*, Vol. 42, No. 19, 8 October 2020 (6 pages).
4. Franz-Stephan Gady, "[From 'Alliance Balance' to 'Coalition Equilibrium': Austria's Transformation of the last Coalition against Napoleon](https://www.napoleon-series.org/research/government/diplomatic/c_1813Alliance.html)," April 2010, *The Napoleon Series*, 10 pages.) https://www.napoleon-series.org/research/government/diplomatic/c_1813Alliance.html.

WEEK 6: OTTO VON BISMARCK (FEBRUARY 10th and 12th)

This week we will examine the statecraft of Otto von Bismarck (1815-1898), called “the greatest master of diplomacy in the modern era.” No historical figure bears more responsibility for the state of great power politics in the long period between 1815 and 1945, and few, if any, in history have managed the strategic policy of their states with such virtuosity. His decisions and policies established the groundwork for the most important geopolitical events of the twentieth century, and his principal creation, a German nation-state at the heart of Europe, endures in truncated form after a half-century of painful adaptation to the world without his guidance.

Presentation: Was Bismarck a model of realistic statecraft? OR Were Bismarck’s successes outweighed by his failure to shape an order that outlasted him?

Readings: 87 pages

1. *Kissinger, *World Order*, pp. 73-82.
2. Marcus Jones, “[Strategy as Character: Bismarck and the Prusso-German Question, 1862-1878](https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511974182.004),” in *The Shaping of Grand Strategy: Policy, Diplomacy, and War*, eds. Williamson Murray, Richard Hart Sinnreich, and James Lacey (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011), pp. 79-110.
<https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511974182.004>.
3. Hajo Holborn, “Bismarck’s Realpolitik,” *Journal of the History of Ideas* 21, no. 1 (1960), pp. 84-98.
4. Stacie E. Goddard, “When Right Makes Might: How Prussia Overturned the European Balance of Power,” *International Security* 33, no. 3 (2008), pp. 110-142.

Additional (Optional) Reading for Use in Assignments -

For those who want to dig deeper in their essays or presentation into the comparison between Metternich and Bismarck, and how it can inform American statecraft today, then you will want to consult -

- A. Wess Mitchell, “Mastering the Multi-Front Challenge: The Diplomatic Strategies of Metternich and Bismarck,” Marathon Working Paper, 14 December 2021, Prepared for the Office of Net Assessment, United States Department of Defense, 116 pages (Particularly the ‘Introduction,’ ‘Application’ and ‘Conclusion.’)

WEEK 7: WOODROW WILSON (February 17th and 19th)

In their studies of President Woodrow Wilson (1913-1921) and the First World War (1914-1918), most historians have assumed that the near-pacifist Wilson had little appreciation for the concept of force as an extension of diplomacy. However, on more careful investigation, it becomes apparent that Wilson not only developed realistic and clearly articulated war goals but that he was able to coordinate his larger diplomatic purpose with the use of force perhaps better than any war President before or since. Wilson defined the war in reference to democracy, followed by the defeat of the Central Powers, would prove pivotal in the normative and political rehabilitation of the concept. This week we will discuss Wilson’s belief that the one of the most important outcomes of the First World War had to be the completion of a process that had started with the American Revolution, as popular sovereignty supplanted monarchy as the dominant form of state legitimacy.

Presentation: Was Woodrow Wilson a naïve idealist? Or was he a realistic statesman with the most plausible policies to navigate World War One and its aftermath?

Readings: 69 pages

1. *Robert Kagan, “Woodrow Wilson and the Rise of Modern American Grand Strategy,” in *The New Makers of Modern Strategy*, ed. Hal Brands (Princeton: Princeton University Press), pp. 545-

568. (24 pages).

2. David C. Gompert, Hans Binnendijk, and Bonny Lin, "Woodrow Wilson's Decision to Enter World War I, 1917," in *Blinders, Blunders, and Wars: What America and China Can Learn* (RAND Corporation, 2014), 71-80. (10 pages).
3. Michael Neiberg, 'Blinking Eyes Began to Open: Legacies from America's Road to the Great War, 1914-1917,' [*Diplomatic History*](#), Vol. 38, No. 4 (SEPTEMBER 2014), pp. 801-812 (12 pages)
4. Henry Kissinger, *World Order*, pp. 247-269. (23 pages).
5. Charlie Laderman, 'Woodrow Wilson and the End of World War One,' American History Hit, 09/30/2024, [Woodrow Wilson & The End of WW...-American History Hit – Apple Podcasts](#)

WEEK 8: THE FAILURE OF APPEASEMENT (February 24th and 26th)

Appeasement is often seen as a natural strategy to prevent the horrors of war. This week students will consider why appeasement failed as a strategy in Britain during the 1930s. Did Neville Chamberlain's government try to appease Hitler's Germany not merely out of fear of conflict or misjudgment of Hitler's intentions, but also as a strategic response to domestic political constraints and international pressures? How best should the lessons of Britain's failed appeasement strategy be applied in the present? This week students will develop answers to these difficult questions.

Presentation: Was appeasement a sensible and rational policy? Did it ultimately help Britain triumph in World War Two? Or was it a misguided policy that made Britain less secure and rendered war inevitable? What lessons can we learn from appeasement for the present day?

Readings: 74 pages

1. Peter Trubowitz and Peter Harris, "When States Appear: British Appeasement in the 1930s," *Review of International Studies*, 41, no. 2 (2015), pp. 289-311.
2. Christopher Layne, "Security Studies and the Use of History: Neville Chamberlain's Grand Strategy Revisited," [*Security Studies*](#) 17, No. 3 (2008), pp. 397-437. <https://doi.org/10.1080/09636410802319628>.
3. Paul Kennedy, 'A Time to Appear,' *The National Interest*, No. 108, (July/August 2010), pp. 7-17.

Assignment: Midterm Examination – March 3rd

WEEK 9: WINSTON CHURCHILL (MARCH 5th)

Soldier, parliamentarian, Prime Minister, orator, painter, writer, husband, and leader—all of these facets combine to make Churchill one of the most complex and fascinating personalities in history. Churchill was the only British politician of the twentieth century to become an enduring national hero. His unique image, complete with V-sign, giant cigar, and outlandish costumes. Churchill offended every party and faction in the land. Yet all but the most hostile also conceded that he possessed great abilities, remarkable eloquence, and a streak of genius, and with the coming of World War II, the man long excluded from high office—on the grounds that he was a danger to King and Country—became the savior of that country, a truly great war leader. This week we will look at the two great victories Churchill won in World War II. The first was a victory over Nazi Germany. The second, a victory over the legion of skeptics who derided his judgement and denied his claims to greatness.

Presentation: Was Winston Churchill the indispensable figure who ensured Britain's victory in World War Two?

Readings: 50 pages

1. Robert G. Kaufman, "[Winston S. Churchill and the Art of Statecraft: The Legacy of Principled Internationalism](https://doi.org/10.1080/09592299208405852)," *Diplomacy & Statecraft* 3, no. 2 (1992), pp. 159-87. <https://doi.org/10.1080/09592299208405852>.
2. Noel Annan, 'A Review of John Charmley, "Churchill, The End of Glory: A Political Biography," *Daedalus*, Summer, 1993, Vol. 122, No. 3, *Reconstructing Nations and States* (Summer, 1993), pp. 263-272.
3. John Charmley, 'Essay and Reflection: Churchill as War Hero,' *The International History Review*, Feb. 1991, Vol. 13, No. 1 (Feb. 1991), pp. 96-104.
4. Patrick Porter, "[Winston Churchill, Arch-Pragmatist](https://engelsbergideas.com/essays/churchill-arch)," 29 November 2022, *Engelsberg Ideas*, 5 pages. <https://engelsbergideas.com/essays/churchill-arch>.

WEEK 10: NUCLEAR STATECRAFT (MARCH 10th and MARCH 12th)

Visit to University of Florida Archives at Smathers Library as part of Experiential Learning Assignment.

This week focuses on the distinctive logic and challenges of nuclear statecraft, as global strategy has become inseparable from the existence of weapons capable of total destruction since the end of World War Two. We will explore how leaders wielded the threat of nuclear force through brinkmanship, calculated ambiguity, and the theory of deterrence—seeking to prevent war not by fighting, but by making its costs unthinkable. Students will consider how nuclear weapons reshaped the practice of statecraft, forcing leaders to balance resolve with restraint.

We'll be looking at the role of nuclear weapons in shaping the most dangerous stand-off of the Cold War – the Cuban Missile Crisis. And we'll also be discussing the contemporary ramifications of the proliferation of nuclear weapons and the impact on American statecraft.

Presentation: Did nuclear weapons help keep the Cold War cold? OR How have nuclear weapons transformed American statecraft and grand strategy?

Readings: 81 pages

1. *Graham Allison, 'The Cuban Missile Crisis,' in Steve Smith, Amelia Hadfield and Tim Dunne, *Foreign Policy: Theories, Actors, Cases* (Oxford University Press, 2016), Chapter 14. (27 pages)
2. Francis Gavin, 'Rethinking the Bomb: Nuclear Weapons and American Grand Strategy,' *Texas National Security Review*, Vol. 2, Issue 1, (November 2018) 26 pages.
3. David Holloway, 'Nuclear Weapons and the Escalation of the Cold War,' in Melvyn Leffler and Odd Arne Westad, *Cambridge History of the Cold War*, (Cambridge University Press, 2010), pp. 376-397.
4. Lawrence Freedman, 'Great Powers, Vital Interests and Nuclear Weapons,' *Survival*, Vol. 36, Issue 4, 1994, pp. 35-52.

WEEK 11: HENRY KISSINGER (MARCH 17th and 19th)

Henry Kissinger (1923-2023), a native of Germany, was there when fascism rose in Europe, fought Nazi Germany in the Second World War, and held power during the height of the Cold War. In his role as U.S. national security adviser (1969-1975) and secretary of state (1973-1977), Henry Kissinger played a decisive role in the expansion of the Vietnam War to Cambodia and Laos and the overthrow of democratically elected leaders such as Salvador Allende in Chile. As for Kissinger's role in ending official U.S. involvement in the Vietnam War by negotiating the 1973 Paris Peace Accords, he won a Nobel Peace Prize for it. This week, we will analyze Kissinger's record to understand why political the statesman generated great fascination in both admirers and detractors.

Presentation: Was Kissinger too obsessed with power and order? Was his use of history the key to his success or did it lead to diplomatic failures?

Readings: 49 pages

1. *Robert Beisner, 'History and Henry Kissinger,' *Diplomatic History*, Volume 14, Issue 4, October 1990, 18 pages
2. Carlos Roa, "[Farewell to Kissinger: A Colossus of Modern Statecraft](https://www.hungarianconservative.com/articles/opinion/kissinger_obituary_bipolar-world-order_multipolarityfarewell-to-kissinger-a-colossus-of-modern-statecraft/)," 12 January 2023, *Hungarian Conservative*, 3 pages.
3. Symposium, "[Peace or Destruction – What was Kissinger's Impact](https://responsiblestatecraft.org/henry-kissinger-legacy/)"? 1 December 2023, *Responsible Statecraft*, 5 pages.
4. Betty Miller Unterberger, *Review of Power Politics and Statecraft: The World According to Kissinger*, *Review of Diplomacy* by Henry Kissinger (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1994). *Reviews in American History* 23, no. 4 (1995), 6 pages
5. Michael Pezzullo, "Conception and Conjecture in Statecraft: Insights from Henry Kissinger," 20 August 2024, *The Strategist*, 5 pages.
6. Hugh White, "[Henry Kissinger: A Man for the Times](https://www.lowyinstitute.org/the-interpreter/henry-kissinger-man-times)," 30 November 2023, *The Interpreter*, 5 pages.
7. Robert D. Kaplan, "[The Tragedy Behind Kissinger's Realpolitik](https://unherd.com/2023/11/the-tragedy-behind-kissingers-statecraft/)," 30 November 2023, *The UnHerd*, 4 pages.

WEEK 12: RONALD REAGAN (MARCH 24th and 26th)

Historians have long debated the factors that brought about the end of the Cold War. At the center of the debate stands US President Ronald Reagan (1981-1989). This week we will analyze Reagan's statecraft by examining his grand strategy. Was his statecraft a product of internal bureaucratic politics that reflected broader internal domestic political pressures? Or was it predicated upon Reagan's reading of the international strategic situation that confronted the United States? This is the classic debate of what drives statecraft: the primacy of domestic policy or the primacy of foreign policy?

Presentation: How significant was Reagan's role in the end of the Cold War? Did Reagan have a clear grand strategy or not?

Readings: 66 pages (+ audio)

2. Melvyn P. Leffler, "Ronald Reagan and the Cold War: What Mattered Most," *Texas National Security Review* 1, no. 3 (May 2018), p. 76-89.

3. Hal Brands, "[Was There a Reagan Grand Strategy? American Statecraft in the Late Cold War](https://www-jstor-org.lp.hscl.ufl.edu/stable/10.7591/j.ctt5hh0bc.8)," in Hal Brands, *What Good Is Grand Strategy?: Power and Purpose in American Statecraft from Harry S. Truman to George W. Bush* (Cornell University Press, 2014), pp. 102-143.
<https://www-jstor-org.lp.hscl.ufl.edu/stable/10.7591/j.ctt5hh0bc.8>
4. "The Peacemaker: Ronald Reagan, The Cold War and the World on the Brink,' Peter Robinson Interview with William Inboden, Hoover Institution, Part 1 - https://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=&cad=rja&uact=8&ved=2ahUKewj5Nvg8fGOAxWske4BHSSmJlEQwqsBegQIFBAG&url=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.youtube.com%2Fwatch%3Fv%3D7JBk7Uvzih0&usg=AOvVaw0k7P5qX_4KvBJLWUgVMOJb&opi=89978449 For full Transcript see - <https://www.hoover.org/research/peacemaker-ronald-reagan-cold-war-and-world-brink> (25)

WEEK 13: THE WAR ON TERROR (MARCH 31st AND APRIL 2nd)

This week we will be exploring the distinct challenges of how statecraft can combat transnational terrorism. We'll be looking at the phenomenon in its broader historical context, looking at the long history of terrorism. Our focus, however, will be on the novel form of terrorism that came to dominate the post-Cold War world – Islamist terrorism, particularly Al-Qaeda and ISIS, and the campaigns against them. What impact did 9/11 have on the international system? Was the American-led 'war against terrorism' an actual war? And how can states deal with the unique threats posed by terror groups?

Presentation: Were the 9/11 terrorist attacks so unprecedented that history offered little guide as to how policymakers should respond? Why do states find it so difficult to develop strategies to deal with transnational Islamist terrorism?

Readings: 65 pages.

1. *Barry Posen, 'The Struggle Against Terrorism: Grand Strategy, Strategy and Tactics,' *International Security*, Vol. 26, No. 3 (Winter 2001-2002) 17 pages.

2. Adam Roberts, 'The War on Terror in Historical Perspective,' *Survival*, Vol. 47, 2004, Issue 2. 23 pages.
3. Michael Howard, 'What's in a Name? How to Fight Terrorism,' *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 81, No. 1, 2002, 6 pages.
4. James Burk (ed.), *How 9/11 Changed Our Ways of War* (Stanford University Press, 2013) 10 pages
5. Hal Brands and Peter Feaver, 'Trump and Terrorism: U.S. Strategy after ISIS,' *Foreign Affairs*, 96, 2 (March/April 2017), 9 pages.

Assignment: Analytical Paper Due

WEEK 14 and 15: THE RETURN OF GREAT POWER POLITICS: RUSSIAN AND CHINESE STATECRAFT (APRIL 7th, 9th and 11th)

Vladimir Putin

President Barack Obama described Russia as a “regional power in structural decline.” Senator John McCain characterized Russia as “a gas station masquerading as a state.” As an unevenly developed Great Power, thus far incapable of structural economic reform, Russia aspires to attain more influence internationally than the size its economy suggests is merited. Like China Russia’s global activism seeks to resist the U.S.-led international order. At the center of it all is Russian President Vladimir Putin. How should we understand Putin’s global reach? What are the implications for U.S. interests and those of its friends and allies? Is there a way to uphold U.S. interests and values and those of friends and allies, while still avoiding the risks of miscalculation, escalation, and confrontation with Putin? If not, which risks are acceptable, when, and why?

Presentation: What motivates Vladimir Putin’s foreign policy? What role does nationalism play in contemporary Russian statecraft? Is Russia today a global power?

Readings: 66 pages

1. Fiona Hill and Clifford Gaddy, 'Chapter Four: The History Man,' in Hill and Gaddy, *Mr. Putin: Operative in the Kremlin* (Brookings Institute Press, 2013) pp. 63-75.
2. Graeme P. Herd, "Understanding Russia's Global Reach," in *Russia's Global Reach: A Security and Statecraft Assessment*, ed. Graeme P. Herd, (Garmisch-Partenkirchen: George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies, 2021), pp. 1-8.
3. George Beebe, Mark Episkopos and Anatol Lieven, "Right-Sizing the Russian Threat to Europe," 8 July 2024, Quincy Brief # 60, *Responsible Statecraft*, 16 pp.
4. Gertjan Plets and Linda van der Pol, "World Heritage and Cultural Statecraft in Putin's Russia: Patriotic Agendas, Flexible Power Relations, and Geopolitical Ambitions," *Change Over Time* 11, no. 2 (Fall, 2022), pp. 200-224.
5. Maria Snegovaya, Michael Kimmage and Jade McGlynn, 'Putin the Ideologue,' *Foreign Affairs*, November 16 2023 - <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/russian-federation/putin-ideologue>

XI JINPING

China’s growing economic clout and President Xi Jinping’s emphasis on national security have further elevated attention to Beijing’s use of economic statecraft. Xi’s approach suggests a greater emphasis on using economic means for the pursuit of security goals. This week, we will examine the role of economic statecraft in China’s contemporary foreign policy and the evolution of goals and strategies under Xi’s leadership; evaluate the record of political effectiveness and continued challenges; and conclude with policy implications.

Presentation: What is the impact of China’s development as an economic and military power on regional and global order? How important is ideology to Xi Jinping’s China? How does their reading of history inform the way that Chinese leaders conduct their statecraft today?

Readings: 63 pages

1. Audrye Wong, "China's Economic Statecraft under Xi Jinping," 22 January 2019, Brookings, 7 pages
2. Paul Gewirtz, "China, the United States, and the Future of a Rules-based International Order," Brookings, 15 pages.

3. Mercy A. Kuo, "China's Statecraft and Global Leadership," 23 October 2023, *The Diplomat*, 9 pages.
4. Mercy A. Kuo, "China's Cybersecurity and Statecraft," 20 February 2024, *The Diplomat*, 8 pages.
5. Vincent K. L. Chang, "China's New Historical Statecraft: Reviving the Second World War for National Rejuvenation," *International Affairs* 98, no 3 (2022), pp 1053–1069.
6. Andrea Dudik, Misha Savic, and Marton Kasnyik, "China's Billions Help Xi Make Useful Friends in Eastern Europe," 6 May 2024, Bloomberg, 8 pages
<https://www.bloomberg.com/news/features/2024-05-06/china-serbia-and-hungary-s-embrace-of-president-xi-opens-doors-in-europe>.

IV. Grading Scale and Rubrics

Grading Scale

For information on UF's grading policies for assigning grade points, see [here](#).

A	94 - 100%		C	74 - 76%
A-	90 - 93%		C-	70 - 73%
B+	87 - 89%		D+	67 - 69%
B	84 - 86%		D	64 - 66%
B-	80 - 83%		D-	60 - 63%
C+	77 - 79%		E	<60

Grading Rubrics

Participation Rubric

A (90-100%)	Typically comes to class with pre-prepared questions about the readings. Engages others about ideas, respects the opinions of others and consistently elevates the level of discussion.
B (80-89%)	Does not always come to class with pre-prepared questions about the reading. Waits passively for others to raise interesting issues. Some in this category, while courteous and articulate, do not adequately listen to other participants or relate their comments to the direction of the conversation.
C (70-79%)	Attends regularly but typically is an infrequent or unwilling participant in discussion. Is only adequately prepared for discussion.
D (60-69%)	Fails to attend class regularly and is inadequately prepared for discussion. Is an unwilling participant in discussion.
E (<60%)	Attends class infrequently and is wholly unprepared for discussion. Refuses to participate in discussion.

Examination Rubric: Essays and Short Answers

	Completeness	Analysis	Evidence	Writing
A (90-100%)	Shows a thorough understanding of the question. Addresses all aspects of the question completely.	Analyses, evaluates, compares and/or contrasts issues and events with depth.	Incorporates pertinent and detailed information from both class discussions and assigned readings.	Presents all information clearly and concisely, in an organized manner.
B (80-89%)	Presents a general understanding of the question. Completely addresses most aspects of the question or address all aspects incompletely.	Analyses or evaluates issues and events, but not in any depth.	Includes relevant facts, examples and details but does not support all aspects of the task evenly.	Presents information fairly and evenly and may have minor organization problems.
C (70-79%)	Shows a limited understanding of the question. Does not address most aspects of the question.	Lacks analysis or evaluation of the issues and events beyond stating accurate, relevant facts.	Includes relevant facts, examples and details, but omits concrete examples, includes inaccurate information and/or does not support all aspects of the task.	Lacks focus, somewhat interfering with comprehension.
D (60-69%)	Fails fully to answer the specific central question.	Lacks analysis or evaluation of the issues and events beyond stating vague, irrelevant, and/or inaccurate facts.	Does not incorporate information from pertinent class discussion and/or assigned readings.	Organizational problems prevent comprehension.
E (<60%)	Does not answer the specific central question.	Lacks analysis or evaluation of the issues and events.	Does not adduce any evidence.	Incomprehensible organization and prose.

Writing Rubric

	Thesis and Argumentation	Use of Sources	Organization	Grammar, mechanics and style
A (90-100%)	Thesis is clear, specific, and presents a thoughtful, critical, engaging, and creative interpretation. Argument fully supports the thesis both logically and thoroughly.	Primary (and secondary texts, if required) are well incorporated, utilized, and contextualized throughout.	Clear organization. Introduction provides adequate background information and ends with a thesis. Details are in logical order. Conclusion is strong and states the point of the paper.	No errors.
B (80-89%)	Thesis is clear and specific, but not as critical or original. Shows insight and attention to the text under consideration. May have gaps in argument's logic.	Primary (and secondary texts, if required) are incorporated but not contextualized significantly.	Clear organization. Introduction clearly states thesis, but does not provide as much background information. Details are in logical order, but may be more difficult to follow. Conclusion is recognizable and ties up almost all loose ends.	A few errors.
C (70-79%)	Thesis is present but not clear or specific, demonstrating a lack of critical engagement to the text. Argument is weak, missing important details or making logical leaps with little support.	Primary (and secondary texts, if required) are mostly incorporated but are not properly contextualized.	Significant lapses in organization. Introduction states thesis but does not adequately provide background information. Some details not in logical or expected order that results in a distracting read. Conclusion is recognizable but does not tie up all loose ends.	Some errors.
D (60-69%)	Thesis is vague and/or confused. Demonstrates a failure to understand the text. Argument lacks any logical flow and does not utilize any source material.	Primary and/or secondary texts are almost wholly absent.	Poor, hard-to-follow organization. There is no clear introduction of the main topic or thesis. There is no clear conclusion, and the paper just ends. Little or no employment of logical body paragraphs.	Many errors.
E (<60%)	There is neither a thesis nor any argument.	Primary and/or secondary texts are wholly absent.	The paper is wholly disorganized, lacking an introduction, conclusion or any logical coherence.	Scores of errors.

V. Student Learning Outcomes (SLOs)

At the end of this course, students will be expected to have achieved the [Quest](#) and [General Education](#) student learning outcomes as follows:

[Social Science](#) (S) courses must afford students an understanding of the basic social and behavioral science concepts and principles used in the analysis of behavior and past and present social, political, and economic issues. Social and Behavioral Sciences is a sub-designation of Social Sciences at the University of Florida.

Social and behavioral science courses provide instruction in the history, key themes, principles, terminology, and underlying theory or methodologies used in the social and behavioral sciences. Students will learn to identify, describe and explain social institutions, structures or processes. These courses emphasize the effective application of accepted problem-solving techniques. Students will apply formal and informal qualitative or quantitative analysis to examine the processes and means by which individuals make personal and group decisions, as well as the evaluation of opinions, outcomes or human behavior. Students are expected to assess and analyze ethical perspectives in individual and societal decisions.

Content: *Students demonstrate competence in the terminology, concepts, theories and methodologies used within the discipline(s).*

- Identify, describe, and explain the methodologies used across the social sciences to examine essential ideas about statecraft (Quest 2, S). **Assessment:** midterm exam, analytical paper, in-class reading quizzes.
- Identify, describe, and explain key ideas and questions about statecraft from renaissance to the present (Quest 2, S). **Assessment:** midterm exam, analytical paper, in-class reading quizzes.

Critical Thinking: *Students carefully and logically analyse information from multiple perspectives and develop reasoned solutions to problems within the discipline(s).*

- Analyse different approaches to statecraft from philosophical, political and historical works (Quest 2, S). **Assessment:** analytical paper, midterm exam.
- Evaluate competing accounts of human reaction to concepts that challenge our own notions of statecraft, using close reading, critical analysis, class discussion, and personal reflection. (Quest 2, S). **Assignments:** analytical paper, discussion questions, midterm exam.

Communication: *Students communicate knowledge, ideas and reasoning clearly and effectively in written and oral forms appropriate to the discipline(s).*

- Develop and present clear and effective written and oral work that demonstrates critical engagement with course texts, and experiential learning activities (Quest 2, S). **Assessments:** experiential learning interview report and discussion, analytical paper, midterm exam.
- Communicate well-supported ideas and arguments effectively within class discussion and debates, with clear oral presentation and written work articulating students' personal experiences and reflections on statecraft (Quest 2, S). **Assessments:** active class participation, experiential learning component, discussion questions.

Connection: *Students connect course content with meaningful critical reflection on their intellectual, personal, and professional development at UF and beyond.*

- Connect course content with students' intellectual, personal, and professional lives at UF and beyond. (Quest 2). **Assessments:** experiential learning component, analytical paper, discussion questions.
- Reflect on students' own and others' experience with statecraft, in class discussion and written work (Quest 2). **Assessments:** experiential learning component, analytical paper, discussion questions.

VI. Quest Learning Experiences

1. Details of Experiential Learning Component

During this semester, the class will attend a public lecture on campus that touches on the course theme of statecraft. Students will be asked to prepare questions to ask the speaker. By Friday, on the 10th week of class at 11:59pm, students will submit a minimum 200-word analysis assignment that responds to the central themes of the lecture.

2. Details of Self-Reflection Component

Self-reflection is built into class discussions, the in-class reading quizzes, the midterm examination, and the final analytical paper. This is indicated in the description of graded work section of this syllabus with an (R). Students will be continuously asked to reflect on how course activities and readings change their perspective on salient themes (statecraft) and affect their view of themselves in the contemporary world.

VII. Required Policies

Additional Academic Policies and Resources

Up-to-date information about academic policies and campus resources can be found here:

<https://syllabus.ufl.edu/syllabus-policy/uf-syllabus-policy-links/>